Why is Palestine called the ‘thrice-promised’ land, and why was this central to the emergence of the ongoing conflict?
By Tatyana Aliye Hanım Sultan Attending: University of Exeter, BA History Age: 20 years old
I am delighted to be able to contribute an article to the Young Ottoman Scholars Society, established by my mother. I think this is a wonderful initiative. I have read all the articles published so far and have learnt so much, and I look forward to reading many more. This is an essay that I recently submitted at University which I hope you find interesting and topical…
Palestine is referred to as the ‘thrice-promised’ land as it has been promised to three conflicting entities. The first of these promises was made to the Arabs in 1915-16, when the British in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence promised Palestine to the Sharif of Mecca through the foundation of an independent Arab State. The second promise came with the signing of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which agreed that Palestine would come under international control. The Balfour Declaration in 1917 led to Palestine becoming the ‘thrice-promised’ land, as this declaration supported the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. These conflicting promises are central to the emergence of the ongoing conflict, as these promises directly contradict each other. Britain made these promises during the First World War to support their own ambitions in the Middle East, and I will discuss these different ambitions in my essay. The contradictory promises made by Britain have meant that both the Arabs and Jews believe that they have the right to the land in Palestine, thereby meaning that a resolution to the conflict is near impossible as their goals and beliefs do not align with each other. Therefore, Britain can ultimately be viewed as responsible for the conflict, along with the other Allied powers.
This essay will initially focus on the three promises and agreements made throughout the First World War: to the Arabs, the international community, and the Jews, and will explain what these promises entailed; furthermore, the essay will discuss how the promises have fuelled conflict. The first period I will look at is Palestine under the British mandate (1920-1948), the Jewish immigration within this period, and the Arab resistance that occurred, such as the 1936-1939 rebellion. The second period is from 1948 until 1990 and is marked by the foundation of the State of Israel and the wars that subsequently occurred, including the 1957 Suez Crisis, the 1967 Six-day War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The final period started in 1990 and was marked by failed attempts at peace through the Madrid Conference and Oslo Accords, along with further unrest and expansion of Israel’s territory.
The first of Britain’s promises was to the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali, in the form of the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. The correspondence ‘consists of ten letters between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty’s High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, from July, 1915 to March, 1916’.[1] Due to his control of Mecca, which is the holiest city in Islam, Hussein had significant levels of influence over the Muslim Arab population in the Middle East, therefore making him a strategic ally for the British. ‘As early as 1915, Britain had promised the Sharif and Emir of Mecca, Husayn ibn ‘Ali al-Hāshimi, that Palestine would be a part of an independent Arab state that would arise after World War I’.[2] Hussein ‘obtained British guarantee that he could retain his title of Grand Sharif, and receive aid in defense of external aggression – in effect, British recognition of an independent Arab kingdom with Husayn as its ruler’.[3] Britain promised this to the Arabs ‘in exchange for an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule’, this resulted in the 1916-18 Arab Revolt, as well as a weakening of the Ottoman efforts in the war.[4] The Ottoman Empire controlled most of the Middle East and had done so since the early 16th Century due to the conquests under Sultan Selim I. However, since the rise of Turkish nationalism and the 1908 Young Turk revolution, there had been a growth in nationalist movements across the Empire, as the CUPs reforms were perceived as threatening Arab identity and autonomy. The promise to the Arabs in the correspondence was sent in a letter on October 24, 1915, that ‘Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca’.[5] Britain’s promise to the Arabs did not explicitly promise Palestine – this intentional vagueness of wording allowed the Arabs to interpret this as being promised Palestine. However, it enabled Britain to rescind this promise. Britain’s vague wording is a common theme throughout the three agreements. In particular, the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the Balfour Declaration said enough to get support from the different groups without explicitly promising anything.
The second of the promises made was in 1916 in the form of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. This agreement was between the British and French diplomats Sir Mark Sykes and François George-Picot, who agreed upon how to divide the Ottoman Empire’s Arab territories, should the Ottomans be defeated in the First World War. ‘The expanse was to be divided into British and French areas of direct control and influence, with Palestine becoming an international entity’.[6] The division of the region was ‘shaped by British strategic interests and France’s historic claim to a special position in the Levant. The agreement envisioned that Britain would have Mesopotamia and a land bridge to the Mediterranean, and France would have Lebanon and a large part of Syria’.[7] The agreement would give Britain control of Iraq, which was desired due to its position in reference to India as it was a key trade route. Most significantly, though, Britain was driven by economic interests in Iraq due to the large amounts of oil discovered there, especially in the northern region. In Fitzgerald’s work, he notes that the ‘presentation of Sir Maurice Hankey’s diaries, have shown how the “oil factor” influenced Britain’s Middle Eastern policy, particularly during the final months of the war’.[8] Furthermore, Mesopotamia was significant as it protected the British-controlled Suez Canal. Despite the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the ‘system that emerged from the final phase of the war and the peace-time diplomacy was in fact quite different from the reality envisaged by Sykes and Picot’, as Palestine became a British Mandate.[9] This view of Palestine as an international administration directly contradicts what was implied in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, and what was later promised to the Jewish community in the Balfour Declaration.
The Balfour Declaration solidified Palestine as the ‘thrice-promised’ land. ‘On November 2, 1917, the British foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, wrote to Lord Rothschild, a prominent figure in British Zionist circles’, and this letter has continued to cause problems in Palestine today.[10] In the letter, Balfour wrote, ‘His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’.[11] The vagueness of what Balfour meant by a ‘national home’ has promoted conflict in Palestine over the last century. The Declaration did not say what this would look like – whether there would be an independent Jewish state or if the Jews would fit into the pre-existing Arab society. The vagueness of the Declaration has allowed different factions of Zionists to come up with conflicting views as to what the national home for Jewish people should look like and what exactly was promised to them by the British. The Balfour Declaration raised ‘all sorts of issues about territorial definitions, the rights of the local population and those of Jewish immigrants seeking to rebuild Zion,’ making the letter Balfour sent to Lord Rothschild extremely detrimental to stability in the Middle East.[12] Morantinos, in his work notes that the ‘letter was the beginning of what would be known as the Nakba or catastrophe for Arabs and Palestinians, and the origin of the State of Israel’, however, these repercussions will be further analysed later in the essay.[13] The British decision to support Zionism during World War One was driven by their own ‘imperial interests in the Middle East, such as the desire to exclude France from Palestine’, Britain wanted to make sure they had strong control of trade routes between India and Europe, which meant Palestine was an essential location, due to its proximity to the Suez Canal.[14] Britain also wanted to gain the US backing as ‘the British cabinet was worried that Germany might make a declaration in support of Zionist aims and thus attract a sympathetic response from the US Jewry’; as well as support from Russia, as it was believed that this gesture ‘might persuade influential Jewish members within the revolutionary movement to attempt to keep Russia in the war’.[15] The British were worried that the Russians would leave the war, as the Bolsheviks had come to power after the October 1917 Revolution, and one of their central promises was to end the war. Overall, the Balfour Declaration had immense consequences and has fuelled the ongoing conflict in Palestine.
The British Mandate of Palestine lasted from 1920 until 1948, when the State of Israel was founded, and Britain was given control of the Palestine Mandate through the League of Nations. The League of Nations Mandate for Palestine refers to ‘the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine’; therefore, a key feature of the Mandate period was the mass immigration of Jews, which fits in line with the promise made in the Balfour Declaration to the Jews.[16] ‘The Jewish population of Palestine grew from 83,790 (less than 8 percent) in 1922 to 608,225 (roughly one-third) in 1946’, making them a very large minority.[17] Jews were migrating from mainly Eastern Europe, primarily Poland. With the rise of Hitler and the Nazi Party in 1933 and the subsequent antisemitic policies that followed, thousands of Jews from Germany were also coming to Palestine. However, ‘many of these refugees were not Zionists, the restrictive immigration quotas imposed by such countries as the United States and Canada compelled them to seek refuge in Palestine’.[18] The Jewish immigration led to land acquisition from Arab land owners and the displacement of Arab communities, which contradicts another part of the Palestinian Mandate that refers to the protection of the Palestinian Arabs that the British should safeguard the ‘rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced’.[19]
The 1936-39 rebellion was a reaction against British policy, unregulated immigration and land buyouts, as the ‘Palestinians were frustrated by the lack of response from the British to their demands’.[20] The British authorities then directly went against the demands of the rebellion as they ‘approved the entry of thousands of new immigrants and opened a port in Tel Aviv operated by Zionist workers to replace the striking Jaffa port’.[21] The Arab Revolt did not have a clear leader and ‘straddled the fence between a peasant war a people’s revolutionary war. Its median position resulted from the inadequacy of its political arm and the failure to establish a complete political direction of the guerilla campaign’.[22] At the peak of the rebellion it is estimated that there were ‘5,000-8,000 Palestinian participants’.[23] The British, on the other hand, were able to stop the rebellion using military force, which was far superior to that the Palestinians possessed. The response to this was the 1939 White Papers, which limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 for 5 years. However, this was viewed by the Zionists as a betrayal of the Balfour Declaration, as it was seen as stopping their goal of a homeland in Palestine. The British wanted peace in Palestine and to promote their interests, as the Second World War was beginning to be seen as inevitable, and the British needed to move their troops from Palestine to the Suez Canal to defend it. As well as this, ‘in the event of Italy blocking the Red Sea exit of the Canal during war, reinforcements from India would have to be brought to Egypt overland from the Persian Gulf, via Palestine’.[24] Therefore, Britain wanted to bring an end to the period of rebellion. Overall, this belief from both the Zionists and the Arabs that they were both being betrayed and not getting what was promised to them, respectively, is central to the ongoing conflict, as both groups believe they have the right to the land of Palestine. Furthermore, the massive amounts of immigration that occurred throughout the British mandate have created huge divides and, therefore, inevitable conflicts.
The creation of Israel as a Jewish State further exacerbated this conflict between the Arab world and Jews. The division of the area into two states would mean each state would have a majority of its population. However, a major problem of this proposal is that hundreds of thousands of Arabs would be part of the Jewish state. ‘Most of the Arab states, led by Mufti, objected to these proposals and regarded them as a declaration of war against the Arab world’ furthermore, the Jews viewed the initial territory as a starting point for further expansion.[25] The foundation of Israel on May 14, 1948, led to ‘units from the armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Iraq’ to invade Israel the following day, ‘launching a regional war, interspersed with several truces, that lasted until December 1948’.[26] This regional war had a detrimental impact on the Palestinians as it ‘expanded the territory of Israel beyond what had been allotted to the Jewish state under resolution 181 and displaced 726,000 Palestinian Arab refugees’.[27] This mass displacement of Palestinians from their homes and the subsequent refugee crisis is referred to as the “nakba,” which means catastrophe in Arabic, and ‘in 1950, 960,000 Palestinians were registered for relief by the United Nations’.[28] After Israel was founded, between 1948 and 1951, ‘the Jewish population of Israel increased from approximately 650,000 to slightly more than 1.3 million. This was the result of an influx of some 684,000 immigrants’.[29] Therefore, the continued Jewish immigration caused greater issues for the native Palestinian Arabs, as they were being driven from their homes due to the massive immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe.
The Six-day War in June 1967 further increased the number of Palestinian refugees. The Six-day War was an Arab attempt to liberate Palestine. Its result was an even greater loss of Palestinian territory to Israel, and subsequently, the number of refugees rose to ‘1.3 million in 1968’. The 1967 war was ‘the second all-out attempt in a generation to abort the Jewish national revival, and it ended in an even greater ignominy than its 1948 precursor. Then, only half of Palestine had been lost. Now the land was lost in its entirety, together with Egyptian and Syrian territories’.[30] The creation of Israel did not just lead to major regional wars but also a popular uprising, named the First Intifada, which started in 1987 and ‘lasted six years until it was called off by the Palestinian leadership in the wake of the Oslo agreements’.[31] One of the main outcomes of the First Intifada was that it ‘saw the birth of Hamas, the Islamic opposition movement formed by Sheik Yassin in February 1988. The organisation, which emerged out of the Muslim Brotherhood, stressed a return to conservative Islamic values and provided a network of health and social services for Palestinians in the occupied territories’.[32] However, the First Intifada ended with the Oslo Accords, and the Second Intifada started in 2000. The promise to the Jews to create a “national home” and the resulting creation of Israel is central to the ongoing conflict, as it has resulted in the mass displacement of Palestinians. The ongoing conflict is driven by the disagreement over land. As seen in the 1948 War, the 1967 Six-day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli forces will continue to press for more land, and the Palestinians will continue to reclaim their territory.
The promises made during the First World War regarding Palestine, to both the Arabs and Jews, are still central to the ongoing conflict and are fuelling the debate, despite over a hundred years passing since they were made. Despite international actions for peace, there is still a war in the region. The decades pre-dating the Madrid Conference was a period of wars, ‘the Suez crisis in 1956, the Six-Day War in 1967, and the Yom Kippur in 1973’.[33] The Madrid Conference of 1991 ‘launched the beginning of the so-called “peace process” and its terms of reference were very clear: “land for peace,” which entailed Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories and that the Arab countries should sign peace agreements with Israel’.[34] The Oslo Agreements followed the Madrid Conference, and the process had several aspects. On September 9-10, 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) exchanged letters of mutual recognition, ‘these are the most important of all the documents since they represented a historical breakthrough’, as previously the PLO did not recognise Israel.[35]
Despite some international efforts for peace, they are inherently flawed as the USA, which is a major global player, continues to give support for Israel and, in some instances, has caused an escalation of the conflict. Significantly, ‘in 1962, President John F. Kennedy emphasized the establishment of special relations between the US and Israel, including the supply of military equipment’, which proved particularly useful in the 1967 Six-day War.[36] Furthermore, starting in 1985, Israel was given $3 billion annually from the US, making ‘Israel one of the most powerful military states in the region’.[37] It is because of the ‘full scale US military and economic support, Israel is passionately pursuing the concept of ‘greater Israel’ which rejects the right of Palestinians for nationhood’.[38] In 2018, the US, under the Trump administration, moved the USA’s embassy from Israel’s capital, Tel Aviv, where all other countries have their Israeli embassies, to Jerusalem. This act goes against the fact Jerusalem is meant to be an international city having strong religious importance for the three monotheistic religions, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Consequently, this action by President Trump clearly shows the USA’s bias towards Israel, and it also fuels disputes and disagreements over territorial boundaries. Therefore, it is the combination of the promises made, and in particular the Balfour Declaration, along with the West’s support for Israel, that has caused the conflict today. Israel will continue to try and expand their territory, whilst the Palestinians ‘dream of return – of the 1948 refugees and their descendants, across generations – to their lost villages and cities in Israel’.[39]
There is a mixed response from the international community regarding Israel’s recognition. The European Union is an example of a regional organisation that recognises Israel, which was formalised by the EU-Israel Association Agreement in 2000. However, most Arab League countries do not recognise Israel, including Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria, as well as several countries not in the Arab League, such as Iran and Pakistan. With the current conflict between Israel and Palestine, there have been several different suggestions for peace.
‘Some voices in Israel advocate resolving the conflict by accepting the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which has been reaffirmed several times by the Arab League. According to this proposal, Israel would withdraw from all the territories it captures in 1967 and accept “a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194” from December 1948. In return, the Arab world would recognize Israel and make peace with it’.[40]
However, the fundamental problem is that both sides have completely different aims regarding territory.
To conclude, Britain’s actions during the First World War, promising Palestine three contradictory times, created a foundation of competing claims. The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence in 1915, Sykes-Picot in 1916 and the Balfour Declaration in 1917 all go against the other, therefore leading to inevitable problems, with the main issue being that both the Palestinian Arabs and Jews believe that the land of Palestine is rightfully theirs. One key feature of the ‘thrice-promises’ is they were all intentionally vague, meaning that it was never clear to the Arabs exactly what an Arab state would include, and the Balfour Declaration never expanded on what was meant by a “national home” for Jews. Furthermore, because their end goals are completely different, it means conflict is inevitable. The Jews will continue to press for expansion, whereas the Palestinians will always believe the entirety of the land in this region belongs to them. Regarding the ongoing conflict, the primary external power that is increasing hostility is the US, as their actions and support for the Zionist movement have emboldened the Israelis to increase their territory, by the US giving their support, both politically and militarily.
NOTES
[1] “The McMahon Correspondence of 1915-16,” Bulletin of International News 16, no.5 (March 1939): 6-7.
[2] Shaul Bartal, “The Peel Commission Report of 1937 and the Origins of the Partition Concept,” in Jewish Political Studies Review28, no.1/2 (Spring 2017): 53.
[3] Pauline Park, “The WWI Middle East: Western Intervention and Modern-Day Political Conflict,” in Global Tides 11, no. 1 (2017): 1.
[4] Park, “The WWI Middle East: Western Intervention and Modern-Day Political Conflict,” 1.
[5] “The McMahon Correspondence of 1915-16,” Bulletin of International News 16, no.5 (March 1939): 9.
[6] Itamar Rabinovich, Robbie Sabel and Oded Eran, “A Century since the Sykes-Picot Agreement: Current Challenges,” in Institute for National Security Studies (2016): 1.
[7] Rabinovich, Sabel and Eran, “A Century since the Sykes-Picot Agreement,” 1.
[8] Edward Peter Fitzgerald, “France’s Middle Eastern Ambitions, the Sykes-Picot Negotiations, and the Oil Fields of Mosul, 1915-16,” in The Journal of Modern History 66, no.4 (December 1994), 699-700.
[9] Rabinovich, Sabel and Eran, “A Century since the Sykes-Picot Agreement,” 2.
[10] William L. Cleaveland and Martin Bunton, “The Palestine Mandate and The Birth of The State of Israel,” in A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th ed. (Westview Press, 2012), 226.
[11] Arthur James Balfour, “Balfour Declaration,” November 2, 1917.
[12] Alan Sharp, “National Self-Determination: Wilson’s Troublesome Principle,” in Versailles 1919: A Centennial Perspective, 77–100 (Haus Publishing, 2018), 103.
[13] Miguel Angel Morantinos, “A European Call for Palestinian Independence,” in The Cairo Review of Global Affairs 27 (2017): 58.
[14] Park, “The WWI Middle East: Western Intervention and Modern-Day Political Conflict,” 3.
[15] Cleaveland and Bunton, “The Palestine Mandate and The Birth of The State of Israel,” 225.
[16] League of Nations, Mandate for Palestine, (Geneva: League of Nations, 1922), accessed March 24, 2025.
[17] Debra Shushan, “Palestine and Israel at the United Nations: Partition, Recognition, and Membership,” in Charter of the United Nations (Yale University Press, 2014), 159.
[18] William L. Cleaveland and Martin Bunton, “The Palestine Mandate and The Birth of The State of Israel,” in A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th ed. (Westview Press, 2012), 235.
[24] Michael J. Cohen, “Appeasement in the Middle East: The British White Paper on Palestine, May 1939,” in The Historical Journal16, no.3 (1973), 572.
[25] Bartal, “The Peel Commission Report of 1937 and the Origins of the Partition Concept,” 66.
[26] Cleaveland and Bunton, “The Palestine Mandate and The Birth of The State of Israel,” 247.
[27] Debra Shushan, “Palestine and Israel at the United Nations: Partition, Recognition, and Membership,” in Charter of the United Nations (Yale University Press, 2014), 163.
[28] William L. Cleaveland and Martin Bunton, “Israel and the Palestinians From 1948 to the 1970s,” in A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th ed. (Westview Press, 2012), 332.
[29] Cleaveland and Bunton, “Israel and The Palestinians From 1948 to The 1970s,” 325.
[30] Efraim Karsh, “The Six-Day War: The Inevitable Conflict,” in Rethinking the Six-Day War (Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2017), 18.
[31] Mike Berry and Greg Philo, “1987: The First Intifada,” in Israel and Palestine: Competing Histories (Pluto Press, 2006), 82.
[32] Berry and Philo, “1987: The First Intifada,” 87.
[33] Morantinos, “A European Call for Palestinian Independence,” 61.
[34] Morantinos, “A European Call for Palestinian Independence,” 61.
[35] Shamir Hassan, “Oslo Accords: Genesis and Consequences for Palestine,” in Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 71 (2010), 944.
[36] Nina Rzhevska, “The real state and scenarios of the Arab-Israeli conflict settlement in the context of the US foreign policy interests,” in Acta de Historia & Politica: Saeculum XXI 09 (2025): 145.
[37] Rzhevska, “The real state and scenarios of the Arab-Israeli conflict settlement in the context of the US foreign policy interests,” 145.
[38] P.J. Vincent, “Israel and the Policy of Rejectionism: Problems of Peace Process in the Holy Land,” in Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 64 (2003): 1308.
[39] Azar Gat, “What Is the Problem With the Palestinian Problem?” in Institute for National Security Studies (2025): 2.
[40] Gat, “What Is the Problem With the Palestinian Problem?” 5.
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